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ABSTRACT
To date, there has yet to be a study that characterizes the
usage of a real deployed anonymity service. In this paper,
we present observations and analysis obtained by participat-
ing in the Tor network. In particular, we are interested in
answering the following questions: (1) Who uses Tor? (2)
What is the performance of the system? (3) How is the sys-
tem used? (4) What does the traffic distribution look like?
and (5) What are the legal and ethical implications of partic-
ipating in an anonymous network?
We show that the network is used to fight censorship world-
wide. In addition, the system’s performance is characterized
at the circuit-level and we show that the network traffic can
be closely modeled by a Pareto distribution. Finally, the le-
gal and ethical issues that arise from participating in such an
anonymous network are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Tor is a popular multi-hop privacy enhancing system that
is designed to protect the privacy of Internet users from traf-
fic analysis attacks launched by a non-global adversary [13].
Because Tor provides an anonymity service on top of TCP
while maintaining relatively low latency and high through-
put, it is ideal for interactive applications such as web brows-
ing, file sharing, and instant messaging. Since its initial de-
velopment, several researchers have analyzed the system’s
security in an attempt to understand the degree of privacy
that it provides [15, 19, 20, 21]. However, there has yet to
be a study aimed at understanding the more practical “real
world” aspects of such a privacy enhancing system. In this
work, we utilize observations made by our own Tor server to
answer the following questions:
Who is using Tor? The design and development of
anonymous systems such as Tor are motivated to service
people residing in locations where free and uncensored ac-
cess to the Internet is not guaranteed. Thus far, however,
there has been no empirical study describing who the Tor
users are and whether or not they match this target audience.
For example, many governments around the world actively
censor their citizens’ Internet access and it has been sug-
gested that services such as Tor can be used to help individ-
uals in such places resist local censorship. To determine if
this usage exists, we characterize the geographic distribution
of both clients (“Tor proxies”) and servers (“Tor routers”) in
Tor to determine from what parts of the world Tor clients
originate and whether this differs from the distibution of In-
ternet users world-wide.
How is Tor being used? It has been suggested that
Tor’s optimizations for low latency and high throughput traf-
fic have made it ideal for interactive applications [13]. To
prove or refute this, we analyzed application layer header
data relayed through our router to determine the protocol dis-
tribution in the anonymous network. Our results present the
types of application use currently sent through Tor, a sub-
stantial proportion of which contributes non-interactive traf-
fic through the system. In addition, this study analyzes des-
tination server locations to identify trends in the destinations
of exit traffic.
How do the circuits in the network behave and
perform? Clients use the Tor network by source routing
traffic through multi-hop paths, by default three hops. Since
one of the commonly acknowledged costs of anonymity is
performance loss, the biggest questions are: How much la-
tency do Tor circuits incur? How much throughput can cir-
cuits maintain? Is Tor use heavier at certains times of day?
For how long does a client use the same circuit? How much
traffic does a circuit transfer over its life time? Our data
shows that Tor does, in fact, provide a relatively low-latency
transport service. However, throughput is also relatively low
and most circuits are short-lived and transport very little data.
What does the distribution of traffic look like?
Traditional analytical models of privacy enhancing technolo-
gies have often assumed that the distribution of traffic across
the network is uniform. Given Tor’s optimizations for per-
formance, the distribution is skewed, yet it is unclear how to
build an accurate analytical traffic model. We show, based
upon our observations, that the network traffic can be best
characterized by a Pareto distribution.
What are the challenges involved with partic-
ipating in Tor? As a final avenue of study, we attempt to
expose the challenges that are associated with participating
in a privacy enhancing system from legal and policy perspec-
tives. As a consequence of Tor’s design, Tor server operators
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can be held responsible for illicit traffic that flows through
their node when it is used as an exit node. We experienced
many such difficulties running our own node and were even-
tually forced to discontinue our service.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we present a brief overview of the Tor system ar-
chitecture. Section 3 describes our data collection method-
ology. In Section 4, we analyze the geopolitical location
distribution of Tor proxies, routers, and destination servers.
We report observations at the circuit level in Section 5, in-
cluding circuit latency, throughput, and duration. Section 6
explores the application-level protocol distribution for traf-
fic leaving the Tor network. In Section 7, we measure the
internal network traffic distribution. Section 8 explores the
legal and ethical questions and arise from participating in an
anonymous network. Finally, we conclude in Section 9.
2. BACKGROUND
Figure 1: An overview of the Tor system architec-
ture.
Tor’s system architecture attempts to provide a high de-
gree of anonymity and strict performance standards simulta-
neously [13]. At present, Tor provides an anonymity layer
for TCP by carefully constructing a multi-hop path, or cir-
cuit, through the network of Tor servers, or Tor routers,
using a layered encryption strategy known as onion rout-
ing [16]. There are precisely three hops in a circuit; the first
node in the circuit is known as the entrance Tor router, the
middle node is called the mix Tor router, and the final hop
in the circuit is referred to as the exit Tor router. It is im-
portant to note that only the entrance router can determine
the originator of a particular request through the Tor net-
work, and only the exit node can determine the contents and
destination of the request. To achieve its low-latency objec-
tive, Tor does not explicitly reorder or delay packets within
the network. An overview of the Tor system architecture is
given in Figure 1.
3. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY
To better understand real world Tor usage, we set up a Tor
router that joined the currently deployed network. Our router
was configured to use the default exit policy, which allows
most exit traffic to leave our router. The server hosting our
router was connected to a 1Gb/s network link. This config-
uration allowed us to record a large amount of Tor traffic in
short periods of time. While running, our node was consis-
tently among the top three routers in terms of bandwidth of
the roughly 800 routers present.
We understand that there are serious privacy concerns that
must be addressed when collecting statistics from an anony-
mous network. We considered the privacy implications when
choosing what information to log and what information was
too sensitive to store. In the end, we chose to log informa-
tion from two sources: First, we altered the Tor router to log
information about circuits that were established though our
node and cells routed through our node. Second, we logged
only protocol header information from exit traffic that was
relayed through our node. This logging was handled using
tcpdump [23], a common protocol analysis tool.
We ran our Tor server for two periods of four days each, in
December 2006 and January 2007. During these data collec-
tion periods, our Tor server participated in over 2.3 million
circuits, and relayed approximately 1 terabyte (TB) of exit
traffic alone. This traffic represented a large sample of Tor
network traffic, and we believe that our data collection over
a total of eight days is an indicative sample of normal Tor
usage.
3.1 Tor Router Level Logging
Our router used Tor software version 0.1.1.25 with our
own minor modifications to support logging. For every cell
routed through our node, we logged the time that it was re-
ceived, the previous hop’s IP address and TCP port number,
the next hop’s IP and TCP port number, and the circuit iden-
tifier associated with the cell. We did not capture the pay-
load of the cell, any of the cryptographic keys, or reassem-
bled TCP packets from exit traffic. While retaining a record
of this information could degrade Tor users’ anonymity and
is not recommended, the system is designed to resist traffic
analysis attacks from any individual Tor router. Thus, the
information we logged can not be used to link a sender to a
receiver.
3.2 Exit Traffic Logging
In order to gather statistics about traffic leaving the net-
work, we ran tcpdump locally on the same physical server
as our Tor router. Tcpdump was configured to capture only
the first 150 bytes of a packet using the “snap length” option
(-s). This limit was selected so that we could capture up to
the application-level headers for protocol identification pur-
poses. At most we captured 96 bytes of application header
data, since an Ethernet frame is 14 bytes long, an IP header
is 20 bytes long, and a TCP header with no options is 20
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bytes long. We used ethereal [3], another tool for protocol
analysis and stateful packet inspection, in order to identify
application-layer protocols. As a post-processing step, we
filtered out packets with a source or destination IP address
and TCP port number of all active routers published during
our collection periods. This left only exit traffic, since our
server was not running any other network services.
4. GEOPOLITICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
There has been much speculation that privacy enhancing
systems such as Tor can be used as a tool to fight Internet
censorship, particularly from within countries that actively
monitor or filter their citizens’ Internet access. As part of
this study, we investigate where, geo-politically, Tor proxies,
Tor routers, and destination servers are located. Recall that
a proxy’s IP address is visible to a router when that router is
used as the entrance node on the client’s circuit through the
Tor network. Similarly, a destination server’s IP address is
visible to a router when that router is used as the exit node.
Tor router IP addresses are maintained by the Tor directory
servers, and we keep track of the router IP addresses by sim-
ply polling the directory servers periodically.
In order to map an IP address to its corresponding country
of origin, we query the authoritative bodies responsible for
assigning IP blocks to individual countries [1, 2, 4, 7]. In
order to determine the geopolitical distribution of Tor usage
throughout the world, we aggregate IP addresses by country,
and present the proxy, router, and destination server location
distributions during our two data collection periods.
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Figure 2: Geopolitical Tor proxy distribution dur-
ing the December and January data collection peri-
ods. IP addresses assigned to the European Union
are denoted as Europe.
4.1 Geopolitical Tor Proxy Distribution
During both data gathering periods, the client distribution
was similar; the United States, Germany, and China com-
posed the top three countries in terms of number of unique
clients, having 1,653, 1,940, and 2,597 Tor clients, respec-
tively in December and 1,815, 2,449, and 1,686 clients, re-
spectively, during the January data collection period. The
Tor proxy distribution is provided as a histogram in Figure
2.
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Figure 3: Geopolitical router distribution during
the December and January data collection periods.
IP addresses assigned to the European Union are
denoted as Europe.
4.2 Geopolitical Tor Router Distribution
In addition to analyzing client locations, we study the geopo-
litical distribution of Tor routers. During our data collection
periods, we maintained a list of unique Tor server IP ad-
dresses, as provided by an authoritative Tor directory server.
During the December data collection period, there were 499
routers in Germany and 450 in the United States. During
the January data collection period, there were 772 routers in
Germany and 494 in the United States. The router distribu-
tion is provided in Figure 3.
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Figure 4: Geopolitical destination server distribu-
tion during the December and January data collec-
tion periods. IP addresses assigned to the European
Union are denoted as Europe.
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4.3 Geopolitical Destination Server Distribu-
tion
In order to obtain insight into where Tor users’ traffic is
destined, we provide the geopolitical distribution of the exit
traffic from our router. During both data collection periods,
the United States, China and Taiwan were the most popular
destination server locations. During the two data collection
periods, there were 190,645 and 100,663 connections exit-
ing to the United States, 154,647 and 83,571 connections to
China, and 111,668 and 58,873 connections to Taiwan. The
destination server distribution is given in Figure 4.
4.4 Tor Used to Fight Censorship
In order to provide evidence that Tor is used to fight cen-
sorship, it is necessary to show that Tor use is more likely
to occur than real Internet use in a particular country. The
difference in the distributions of Tor clients over both data
collection periods to the distribution of Internet users where
users are more likely to use Tor than the real Internet is
shown in Table 1. Data for additional countries is provided
in Appendix A. We obtained data on the distribution of Inter-
net users by country from Internet World Stats [17], which is
a compliation of current data from a number of trustworthy
sources including Nielsen and the International Telecommu-
nication Union.
Country % Internet % Tor %Tor /
% Internet
United Arab
Emirates 0.12 1.24 10.33
Saudi Arabia 0.23 2.08 9.04
Iran 0.37 1.98 5.35
Germany 4.54 22.12 4.87
Sweden 0.61 1.56 2.56
Switzerland 0.46 0.90 1.96
China 11.85 21.58 1.82
Finland 0.30 0.53 1.77
Poland 1.02 1.77 1.74
Taiwan 1.24 1.30 1.05
Table 1: Percentage of Tor users observed in a coun-
try divided by the Percentage of Internet users in
that country out of the total number of Internet
users in the world.
According to Reporters Without Borders [6], a free press
and free Internet advocacy organization, there are thirteen
countries, labeled “Internet enemies,” where cyber-dissidents
are routinely imprisoned or country-wide Internet access is
monitored or censored. These countries include Belarus,
Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Ara-
bia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam
[5]. In our December data gathering period, clients origi-
nating from one of these countries used our Tor router as an
entrance node on a circuit with the following frequencies:
Belarus - 4, China - 2597, Iran - 194, Saudi Arabia - 172,
and Vietnam - 3. During our January data gathering period,
clients originated from the following “Internet enemy” coun-
tries: Belarus - 1, China - 1686, Iran - 198, Saudi Arabia -
240, Syria - 1, and Vietnam - 3. The geopolitical distribu-
tion of Tor clients provides evidence that privacy enhancing
systems such as Tor are tools used to combat government
sanctioned Internet censorship. It is not possible to directly
correlate the entrance and exit traffic; however, there is a
large volume of client traffic originating in China and a large
amount of router traffic exitting to Taiwan, which suggests
that Tor may be used to fight China’s policy of censorship.
5. CIRCUIT MEASUREMENTS
One of Tor’s most important design goals is to provide a
low latency, high throughput transport service that is suitable
for supporting interactive applications. However, a common
reason given why most people do not use Tor is that it is
"slow." Tor incurs greater latency when compared to direct
connections, since Tor routes all packets through a circuit of
three hops (by default). Some routers are also highly con-
gested since their limited bandwidth must be shared among
several circuits simultaneously. As part of our circuit-level
measurements, we examine how Tor use varies with the time
of day and we measure the latency across a large number of
circuits. Additionally, we study how Tor circuits effect sys-
tem throughput. We finally look at circuit duration and the
amount of data transported by circuits routed through our
Tor router.
5.1 Circuit Rhythms
In order to understand Tor use as a function of time of
day, we examine the number of circuits observed through
our router over the course of the data collection periods. We
plot the number of unique connections observed versus time
of day in Figure 5(a).
When our Tor router first joined the network, it took sev-
eral hours to integrate into the network, and the number of
connections slowly increases over this warm-up time. Once
integrated, the graph indicates that Tor use is cyclical, with
a period of approximately one complete day. In addition,
peak hours of Tor use occur at 14:00-16:00 GMT, when over
12,000 unique circuits per hour were observed. Tor use is
lowest at 0:00 (midnight) GMT, when less than 9,000 cir-
cuits per hour were observed. The greatest difference be-
tween the high and low times was a 37% decrease from the
peak. While the network remains used at all times of day,
this shows that a significant correlation between Tor use and
time of day exists.
This time correlation is consistent with the client distribu-
tions observed in Section 4.1. We examine the nature of Tor
usage within Asia, Europe, and North America separately in
Figure 5(b). To obtain the locations of Tor users over time,
it is only possible to ascertain the client’s location when our
Tor router is used as the entrance router in a circuit. Using
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(a) Global circuit connections as a function of the time
of day.
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(b) Asian, European, and North American circuit con-
nections as a function of the time of day.
Figure 5: The observed circuit connections are plotted over the course of one data collection period.
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Figure 6: PDF and CDF of measured path latencies through Tor.
this data, users from Asia comprise the most circuit connec-
tions, following by Europe and North America. Usage over
time in Asia and the United States does not conform to a
clear cyclical pattern; however, European users are most fre-
quent during European daytime hours and are least abundant
during the night. European users decrease by as much as
62.5% during their off-peak hours. This pattern contributes
highly to the global Tor usage pattern shown in Figure 5(a).
5.2 Circuit Latency
To measure latency of circuits, we used echoping [14], a
network performance measurement tool, by routing echo re-
quests through the Tor network to an echo server with a high
bandwidth link. The server’s echo response is also routed
through Tor back to the client. This procedure gives an ac-
curate round trip time (RTT) measurement. A base-line mea-
surement was taken by directly sending echo requests to the
server, which resulted in an average RTT of 0.47 seconds
with negligible variance. Figure 6 shows the probability
density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the latency measurements through Tor.
The figures reveal that the median latency of a circuit is
approximately 4 seconds with a high variance and a max-
imum observed latency of 120 seconds. At the 25th per-
centile, a circuit experienced under 2 seconds of latency, at
the 75th percentile, a circuit incurred about 7 seconds of la-
tency, and at the 90th percentile, 13 seconds of latency was
observed. The mean was 6.09 seconds with a standard devi-
ation of 10.14 seconds. In the case of higher latency circuits
(at the 90th percentile and above), it is probable that the cir-
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Figure 7: PDF and CDF of measured throughput through Tor.
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Figure 8: PDF and CDF of circuit lifespans through Tor.
cuit failed and had to be reconstructed. This shows the cost
of privacy in the form of increased latency.
5.3 Circuit Throughput
To collect data about throughput over Tor circuits, we
transfered a 128 KB file from a web server through the Tor
network and measured the download time. A base-line was
produced by measuring the throughput while downloading
the file directly. The base-line throughput was 270 KB/s
with marginal variance. Figure 7 shows the PDF and CDF
of the throughput measurements through Tor. The median
throughput was 6.8 KB/s and the mean was 12.6 KB/s with
a standard deviation of 15.2 KB/s. At the 25th percentile,
circuit throughput was 3.2 KB/s, at the 75th percentile, a
circuit provided 14.6 KB/s, and at the 90th percentile, 35.8
KB/s throughput was maintained. The maximum observed
throughput during the observation was 180.8 KB/s. This
demonstrates that most Tor circuits provide relatively low
throughput transport.
5.4 Circuit Duration
Circuit duration was measured during our data collection
while operating a Tor router. As depicted in Figure 8, the
median circuit duration was 20-30 seconds. At the 25th per-
centile, a circuit lasted for under 10 seconds, at the 75th per-
centile, a circuit is used for 210 seconds, and at the 90th per-
centile, a circuit is used for 610 seconds. The mean circuit
duration is 814 seconds with a standard deviation of 7900.5
seconds. The longest living circuit was observed for 242380
seconds, or 67.3 hours. This shows that the vast majority of
circuits are short-lived. The median circuit duration is suffi-
cient for transferring small amounts of data over HTTP, for
example.
To demonstrate that the two data collection periods are
7
0 5000 10000 15000
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Kilobytes (KB)
Pe
rc
en
til
e
PDF of Kilobytes per Path
(a) PDF of kilobytes transfered over circuits.
0 5000 10000 15000
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Kilobytes (KB)
Pe
rc
en
til
e
CDF of Kilobytes per Path
(b) CDF of kilobytes transfered over circuits.
Figure 9: PDF and CDF of kilobytes transfered over Tor circuits.
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tions from the January and December data collection
periods.
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Figure 10: These plots show that the observations from both data collection periods are from the
same distribution. This verifies that the data collection was consistent between observation periods.
consistent, we show a quantile-quantile (QQ) plot in Figure
10(a). A linear relationship between the observed quantiles
from the two data collection periods indicates that the two
data sets are taken from the same distribution [18]. This
demonstrates that the data collection was consistent between
observations.
5.5 Circuit Capacity
In order to measure capacity of Tor circuits, we observed
how many bytes tranversed circuits during our participation
in the Tor network. The PDF and CDF of the bytes trans-
fered per circuit are given in Figure 9. At the median, 6.1
KB traversed a circuit. At the 25th percentile, about 1.0 KB
flowed through a circuit, at the 75th percentile, 31.2 KB was
sent, and at the 90th percentile, 201.7 KB was transferred.
However, the mean circuit transported 730.8 KB with a stan-
dard deviation of 10312.6 KB.
The maximum amount of data transferred over a circuit
was 1.5 gigabytes (GB). This demonstrates that while most
circuits transport very little real data, there exist outliers that
are able to sustain the circuit for a sufficient amount of time
to transfer several orders of magnitude more data - although
this is quite rare. The median circuit capacity would be suf-
ficient to transfer a relatively small web page over HTTP. In
fact, these circuit-level measurements are highly consistent
with the observed protocol distribution.
To demonstrate that the two data collection periods are
consistent, we provide a QQ plot in Figure 10(b).
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Protocol
December January Total
Percent Raw Percent Raw Percent Raw
Web (HTTP, HTTPS) 89.77 4,678,423 90.74 5,826,413 90.31 10,504,836
Peer-to-peer (BitTorrent) 9.80 510,530 8.78 564,023 9.24 1,074,553
Instant Messaging (AIM,IRC,Jabber,MSNMS,YMSG) 0.26 13,038 0.26 14,696 0.25 27,734
E-Mail (POP,IMAP) 0.14 7,202 0.05 3,127 0.09 10,326
Telnet 0.02 603 0.12 7,798 0.07 8,401
FTP 0.03 1,495 0.04 2,293 0.03 3,788
Total 100 5,211,291 100 6,418,350 100 11,629,641
Table 2: Protocol breakdown of identifiable exit traffic during the December and January data collection
periods by number of TCP connections.
Protocol
December January Total
Percent Raw Percent Raw Percent Raw
Peer-to-peer (BitTorrent) 67.58 309GB 64.37 346GB 65.83 655GB
Web (HTTP, HTTPS) 32.00 146GB 35.24 189GB 33.7 336GB
FTP 0.19 882MB 0.19 1GB 0.19 2GB
Instant Messaging (AIM,IRC,Jabber,MSNMS,YMSG) 0.14 654MB 0.14 718MB 0.14 1,372MB
E-Mail (POP,IMAP) 0.08 382MB 0.02 131MB 0.05 513MB
Telnet 0.02 80MB 0.03 156MB 0.02 236MB
Total 100 457GB 100 538GB 100 995GB
Table 3: Protocol breakdown of identifiable exit traffic during the December and January data collection
periods by amount of bytes.
5.6 Discussion
In our analysis of Tor performance at the circuit level, we
have shown that the volume of Tor traffic is correlated with
the time of day. We have also confirmed that Tor has met
its goal of providing a low-latency transport service; how-
ever, it cannot sustain a high level of throughput. Finally,
our data suggests that Tor circuits are short-lived and indi-
vidually transport a small amount of data. We restrict this
performance study to the circuit-level, due to Tor’s multi-
hop architecture. Given the limited perspective obtained by
running a single Tor router, it is only feasible to report statis-
tics at the circuit-level. The only way to study individual
Tor routers is to control a significant portion of the network,
which is impractical due to the resource requirements and
not recommended for security and privacy reasons.
6. PROTOCOL DISTRIBUTION
The designers of the Tor network have placed a great deal
of emphasis on achieving low latency and reasonable through-
put in order to allow interactive applications, such as web
browsing, to take place within the network. As part of this
study, we were interested in observing which application-
level protocols were seen exiting our Tor node. Recall that
we used ethereal, which can accurately identify most com-
monly used application-level protocols. For the December
data collection period, Ethereal could identify 87% (5,211,575)
of the established TCP connections and 83% (457GB) of the
total exit traffic. For the Janurary data collection period,
Ethereal could identify 85% (6,420,462) of the established
TCP connections and 84% (538GB) of the total exit traffic.
The most common protocol, measured by the number of
established TCP connections, during both collection periods
was HTTP, which is not surprising since there are browser
plug-ins [9] that help to tunnel their web traffic through a
Tor proxy. This is consistent with the circuit-level obser-
vations that the majority of the circuits transported a small
amount of data. The next most commonly observed protocol
was Bittorrent, a popular peer-to-peer protocol for file shar-
ing. Finally, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) traffic was observed
frequently during both collection periods, which could be
encrypted HTTP (HTTPS) traffic or other protocols that use
SSL for confidentiality. E-mail (POP and IMAP), chat/instant
messaging (AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), Internet Relay
Chat (IRC), Jabber, Microsoft Messenger Service (MSNMS),
Yahoo Messenger Service (YMSG)), FTP, and telnet ses-
sions occurred more sporadically. The complete protocol
breakdown by TCP connections is given in Table 2.
The most glaring difference between viewing the proto-
col breakdown measured by the number of bytes, shown in
Table 3, in contrast to the number of TCP connections is
that while HTTP accounted for the majority of TCP connec-
tions, it is the BitTorrent protocol that uses the majority of
the bandwidth within the Tor network. This is not shocking
since BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol mostly used
to download large files.
6.1 Is Peer-to-Peer Traffic Hurting Performance?
Since the TCP connection statistics show the majority of
connections are HTTP requests, one might be led to believe
that most users are using the network as a HTTP proxy.
However, the few people that do use the network for P2P
applications such as BitTorrent consume the majority of the
bandwidth. The operators of the network consider P2P traf-
fic harmful, not because of ethical or legal reasons, but sim-
ply because it makes the network less useful to those for
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(a) The PDF conforms roughly to a Pareto distribu-
tion with a shape parameter a = 0.0052. Our data fit
the distribution with a mean squared error of MSE =
6.1506 × 10−4. This shows what percentage of the net-
work transports what portion of the users’ traffic.
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(b) The CDF shows that the vast majority of Tor routers
(90%) transport little to no traffic (0.13% of the total
traffic through our router).
Figure 11: PDF and CDF of Tor Router selection.
whom it was designed. In an attempt to prevent the use
of P2P programs within the network the default exit policy
was changed to block the standard file sharing TCP ports
(1214, 4661-4666, 6346-6429, and 6881-6999). The proto-
col breakdown by bytes shows that blocking these ports is
not effective at impeding P2P applications from using the
majority of bandwidth. In fact, it is a losing battle to attempt
to block peer-to-peer traffic since applications can run on
non-standard ports and can be encrypted to hide application
headers.
A potentially better solution to the problem of peer-to-
peer applications might be to explore alternative network
designs that are tailored to these applications. Such designs
may in reality provide slightly less, but sufficient anonymity
for file traders while offering better performance over that
given by the Tor network. If such a network could be created,
most file traders would use it over the Tor network because
of the improved performance. Future work in this area could
additionally relieve the stress placed on the Tor network by
file sharing applications.
7. TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTION
To elucidate Tor’s router distribution, we use observations
regarding which routers are present as previous or next hops
from our router to compute the frequency of occurrence for
each router in the network. These frequencies provide in-
sight into the probability distribution associated with the router
selection process.
7.1 Modeling Router Selection
Understanding the distribution with which different routers
are utilized on circuits can provide valuable insights regard-
ing the system’s vulnerability to traffic analysis. In addition,
a precise probability distribution can be used to build more
realistic analytical models and simulations.
Using the observed router frequencies, we construct a prob-
ability density function (PDF) to model how much of the Tor
network transports what portion of the users’ traffic. The
PDF, given in Figure 11(a), shows that during the December
data collection period, over 30% of the routers each individ-
ually transported 0.01% of the total network traffic from the
perspective of our router. The PDF curve drops sharply; only
2% of the routers individually transported 1.0% of the traf-
fic. The most traffic that any single router transported was
2.56% of the total traffic. This indicates that the vast major-
ity of Tor traffic is handled by a very small set of routers.
This fact may account for a large portion of the variability
in the circuit-level measurements of latency, throughput, cir-
cuit duration, and circuit capacity.
In addition, we provide a cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for the December data collection period in Figure
11(b). The CDF shows that 90% of the routers individu-
ally transported only 0.13% of the total traffic, and cumu-
latively transported a mere 13% of the total network traffic.
Inversely, 10% of the routers cumulatively handled the re-
maining 87% of the traffic.
Probability density functions in which a small subset of
the distribution accounts for a large amount of the probabil-
ity mass can be modeled using a Pareto distribution [18].
This model is traditionally used to describe the distribution
of wealth in a society, where the top 20% of the population
accounts for 80% of the wealth (commonly referred to as the
“80-20” rule). The PDF for a Pareto distribution is defined
as:
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Figure 12: A Pareto quantile-quantile graph is
linear. This indicates that the measured traffic
distribution fits the theoretical Pareto distribu-
tion very closely.
p(x) = ax−(a+1),
where a is the shape parameter. Using the December data
set, a Pareto distribution model is constructed with the shape
parameter a = 0.0052 that has a mean squared error of
MSE = 6.1506× 10−4. In order to further prove that the
measured traffic distribution closely fits a Pareto model, a
quantile-quantile plot is generated with the measured traf-
fic distribution and a Pareto distribution. In the graph, the
observed quantiles are plotted versus the theoretical quan-
tiles for a Pareto distribution. The resulting curve is linear,
which indicates that the observed quantiles are taken from
the Pareto distribution, as shown in Figure 12. The Pareto
distribution model is plotted with the PDF in Figure 11(a).
7.2 Is the Tor Network as Large as it Seems?
In order to provide a low-latency service, Tor utilizes a
preferential routing mechanism probabilistically weighted
to select high-performing, long-uptime Tor routers more fre-
quently than those that perform poorly and are short-lived.
It has been observed that this bias in router selection does, in
fact, degrade the anonymity of the system [10].
The total number of routers over the course of each data
collection period was approximately 1,500. However, only a
few high performing routers are forwarding the vast major-
ity of the traffic. Figure 13 shows the percent of the routers
that are involved in forwarding how much of the total traffic
through the system. This demonstrates the “90-15” rule, in
which 90% of the network traffic is handled by roughly 15%
of the network, which are the highest performing routers.
Many theoretical analyses of multi-hop privacy enhancing
systems make the assumption that all routers in the network
participate equally - each node is chosen with probability
1
N
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Figure 13: This graph shows that a small portion
of the Tor routers- roughly 15% - transport the vast
majority of the traffic through the network - almost
90%.
vations, such an analysis of Tor is clearly flawed.
Furthermore, since there exists a high probability (approx-
imately 0.9) that only 15% of the network handles a user’s
traffic, then that user’s anonymity set has in reality decreased
from N to 0.15N with a high probability. This observation
was originally theorized in Shmatikov and Wang [22]. If
an adversary is able to enter the subset of 0.15N nodes that
are most likely to forward the most traffic, then their ability
to perform attacks such as passive traffic analysis is greatly
increased.
8. LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we will discuss some of our subjective ex-
periences as a Tor operator, including some of the difficul-
ties we encountered while operating as an exit node. Tor
provides a flexible set of options to configure a node to fil-
ter all or specific exit traffic. For our exit node, we chose to
use the default exit policy, which allows most traffic to exit
the network. This was done in order to discover which pro-
tocols and applications are most commonly used within the
network. If we had, for instance, blocked all port 80 traf-
fic, our protocol data would have included much less HTTP
traffic.
Unfortunately, since we are forwarding traffic on behalf of
Tor users, our Tor node’s IP address appears to be the source
of sometimes malicious traffic. Our node’s liberal exit policy
and the large amount of bandwidth that it provided caused
us to receive a large number of complaints ranging from
DMCA §512 (take-down) notices, reported hacking attempts,
IRC bot network controls, and posting of inappropriate and
offensive images to message boards. Due to the volume and
nature of these complaints, our institution’s administration
requested that we stop running our node shortly after the data
11
for this paper was collected. Similar accounts of administra-
tive and law enforcement attempts to prevent Tor use are be-
coming more common as Tor becomes more popular to the
masses [11]. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a
group that works to protect digital rights, has provided tem-
plate letters [8] and offered to provide assistance [12] to Tor
node operators that have received DMCA take-down notices.
The legal questions regarding who is responsible for traffic
exiting a Tor node is an ill-defined issue. However, in our
case, it was not a matter of legality as much as bad press
caused by one especially unfortunate incident involving a
child abuse watch dog organization publicly blaming our in-
stitution for a message group posting.
A solution to our problems could have been to change our
exit policy to reject all exit traffic. A large number of nodes
on the currently deployed Tor network have an exit policy
that blocks all traffic making the node what is called a “mix-
only” node. The majority of circuits built though our node
used our router as the exit node. While mix-only nodes do
help the Tor network, there must be a subset of at least one-
third of the network’s bandwidth capacity that allows exit
traffic, otherwise the network would have insufficient exit
routers to build complete circuits and provide service.
From our experience, the negative activities receive the
most attention from legal and administrative authorities. How-
ever, the cause of Internet privacy is a noble one since Tor
is a successful tool for combating Internet censorship world-
wide. We are still in search of a way to run our high-performance
Tor router as an exit node on a permanent basis.
9. CONCLUSION
This study is aimed at understanding the usage of Tor. In
particular, we provide insight into where, geo-politically, Tor
clients, routers, and destination servers are located. In doing
so, we uncovered evidence that suggests that Tor is used to
fight Internet censorship.
We study the system’s performance at the circuit-level
by measuring latency, throughput, circuit lifespan, and the
amount of data transferred through a circuit. We also exam-
ine how Tor use varies with the time of day. We show that the
system achieves its goal of providing a low latency service;
however, the expected throughput is also quite low. Most of
the circuits transported little traffic and were short-lived. We
also observe that the circuit-level measurements had a high
variability, which is consistent with a highly variable level
of router quality in the network.
We also characterize the application-level protocol distri-
bution in an effort to understand the nature of anonymized
traffic. The most prevalent protocol observed was HTTP,
while the majority of the bandwidth in the system is con-
sumed by the Bittorrent protocol. These protocol observa-
tions are consistent with our circuit-level measurements, in-
dicating that the majority of the circuits observed were used
to transport HTTP traffic.
Finally, we describe the network traffic distribution in terms
of the Pareto distribution. Due to Tor’s use of preferential
routing to optimize performance, a “90-15” rule emerges,
where 90% of the traffic is transported by only 15% of the
Tor routers.
It is our hope that this characterization study will rein-
force the importance of privacy enhancing systems such as
Tor, since we uncovered evidence to suggest that it may be
used to fight censorship. In addition, by understanding the
application-level protocol distribution and the distribution
of traffic throughout the network, more accurate analytical
models can be constructed.
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APPENDIX
A. GEOPOLITICAL DISTRIBUTIONS
Country % Internet % Tor %Tor /
% Internet
United Arab
Emirates 0.12 1.24 10.33
Saudi Arabia 0.23 2.08 9.04
Iran 0.37 1.98 5.35
Germany 4.54 22.12 4.87
Sweden 0.61 1.56 2.56
Switzerland 0.46 0.90 1.96
China 11.85 21.58 1.82
Finland 0.30 0.53 1.77
Poland 1.02 1.77 1.74
Taiwan 1.24 1.30 1.05
Netherlands 0.97 0.96 0.99
France 2.77 2.73 0.98
USA 18.95 17.48 0.92
Italy 2.76 2.40 0.87
Japan 7.74 6.10 0.79
Canada 1.97 1.46 0.74
Austria 1.32 0.91 0.69
Spain 1.77 1.12 0.63
UK 3.37 2.04 0.61
Thailand 0.76 0.40 0.53
Russia 2.13 0.72 0.34
Turkey 1.44 0.43 0.30
Brazil 2.88 0.50 0.17
Table 4: Percentage of Tor users observed in a coun-
try divided by the Percentage of Internet users in
that country out of the total number of Internet
users in the world.
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